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STOCKHOLDERS' LIABILITY IN MINNESOTA
By HENRY W. BALLANTINE*
J USTICE Canty, in a case involving a construction of the Minne-
sota statutes as to the liability of officers and members for
corporate debts, significantly said :'
"Each case adds new proof to what has been so often re-
marked,--that the statutes of this state regulating corporations
are crude, unsatisfactory and in conflict with each other, and it
is often difficult to spell out the real intent of the legislature."
Since some thorough-going revision of our corporation laws,
similar to that of Illinois in 1919, ought to be undertaken at an
early date, it may be of interest to attempt a survey of the im-
portant and complex topic of stockholders' liability. It will be
convenient to take up first, the peculiar situation presented by the
absence of any requirement of subscription to capital stock as a
condition to the transaction of business, second, the rights of
creditors against shareholders with respect to bonus and watered
stock, which will involve a discussion of the so-called "trust
fund doctrine;" third, the rights of creditors against sharehold-
ers by reason of the constitutional or double liability; and fourth,
the remedies and methods of enforcement of the two principal
kinds of stockholders' liability.
I. ANoIMALY OF CORPORATIONS WITHOUT STOCKHOLDERS.
The exemption of the stockholders from unlimited liability is
"the corporation's most precious characteristic," which makes
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
'National New Haven Bank v. Northwestern Guaranty Loan Company,
(1895) 61 Minn. 375, 386, 63 N.A. 1079.
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the corporation the greatest factor in modern business. What is
the security which the law exacts as the condition upon which it
grants this special corporate privilege, viz: the right to incur
liabilities for the discharge of which the persons owning the
business are not liable as partners? A startling gap in this re-
spect is revealed in the recent decision of Moe v. Harris.2  The
plaintiffs having recovered judgment against the Yale Mining
Company for services rendered, sued the three individuals who
had attempted to organize the corporation. The defendants were
named in the articles as directors and officers of the corporation
to serve until their successors were elected. The theory of the
action was that the pretended corporation was a hollow mockery
in view of the fact that no stock had ever been subscribed or
paid for, and it was urged that the defendants were simply co-
partners doing business under the guise of a corporation.
The decision was in favor of the defendants on the ground
that when the organization of the corporation has been completed,
as required by statute, a corporation de jure is brought into ex-
istence notwithstanding the fact that no capital stock has been
subscribed or paid for, no books kept, no by-laws adopted, no
meetings held or officers elected.
"The statute does not make it a condition precedent to the
right of the corporation to transact business, that all or any of
its authorized capital stock shall be subscribed or paid in."
How can there be a corporation without capital stock or
stockholders? The statute does not require that the corporators
should be subscribers to stock. They have no interest whatever
in the company to be formed. As the Pennsylvania Court says :3
"They are mere instruments of the law for purposes of pre-
liminary organization. The moment that is accomplished . . .
the necessary certificates signed and the charter granted they are
functi officio. The corporation is thenceforth composed of
stockholders."
But if there are no subscribers or stockholders of what is the
corporation composed? It is indeed an imaginary and fictitious
entity without body or soul or pocket book, existing only in con-
templation of the law, "a speculative bubble, ready to explode
into thin air at the first touch of adversity." Those designated
as directors and officers are not members unless they are stock-
holders but are merely agents.
2(1919) 142 Minn. 442, 172 N. W. 494.
3Densmore Oil Co. v. Densmore, (1870) 64 Pa. 43.
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The statement in the articles or certificate of incorporation
that the capital stock is a designated amount divided into a cer-
tain number of shares, each of a named par value, creates neither
shares nor capital stock. It expresses the power of the cor-
poration to acquire a capital stock; it creates potential shares; it
fixes the amount of the contribution required from the holder of
a share.'
Corporations for profit organized under the present laws of
Minnesota must have at least $10,000 authorized capital stock,
divided into shares having a nominal or par value of not less
than $1.00. s But apparently by oversight, there is no require-
ment that any minimum amount of stock be subscribed or paid
in as a condition of doing business. The statutes permit a cor-
poration to incur debts without any capital or corporate fund or
resources of any sort answerable for their payment.
By the corporation laws of many states the subscription and
payment of a minimum capital stock is required before the trans-
action of business, and persons who organize corporations and
transact business as corporations without this are made liable to
creditors." Statutory regulations as to banks and financial cor-
porations invariably require that actual capital to a certain
amount be subscribed and paid in before business is begun or
indebtedness created.7 In addition to this, in national banks and
most state banks there is a superadded liability equal to the face
value of the stock. Thus two hundred dollars is placed behind
every one hundred dollars of issued stock as security for deposits
and other debts of the corporation.
Stockholders take the profits and hence should take some of
the risks of the business. They are exempted from personal
liability upon the supposition that they will make some contribu-
tion to the capital of the corporation. A corporation without
any subscribed or paid in stock is "a ghost, a fraud per se, a
4U.S. Radiator Co. v. New York, (1913) 208 N.Y. 144, 152, 101 N.E.
783, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 585.
5Minn. G.S. 1913, sec. 6181.
614 C.J. 980, 982; Walton v. Oliver, (1892) 49 Kan. 107, 30 Pac. 172, 33
A.S.R. 355: Heinze v. South Green Bay L. Co., (1901) 109 Wis. 99, 85
N.W. 145: Badger Paper Co. v. Rose, (1897) 95 Wis. 145, 70 N. W 302;
John V. Farwell Co. v. Jackson Stores, (1911) 137 Ga. 174, 73 S.E. 13;
Wells v. Ivey, (1916) 144 Ga. 548, 87 S. E. 661; Ames v. McCaughey,(1913) 88 Ohio 297, 102 N.E. 989; Thompson, Corps. sec. 4732.
7Minn. G.S. 1913, Sec. 6142, 6348, 6365, 6372, 6405. See also Minn. Laws
1921, ch. 23, sec. 3.
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licensed pirate without fear of capture and execution."" The
legislative grant of limited liability is made very freely in this
country, but as is well said in the New Jersey case of See v.
Heppeniheimer :9
"Men of business, who transact their business under the shield
of a corporate existence, have the great and peculiar advantage
over those trading as individuals of avoiding personal pecuniary
liability. If the enterprise is prosperous, they make and enjoy its
gain. If, on the other hand, it is not prosperous, they lose only
their original investment, which may be a part only of their in-
dividual fortunes, and any loss beyond that investment falls on
the unfortunate creditors. This involves apparent, if not real,
unfairness in trade. Be that is it may, under these conditions,
surely the investors in the stock of trading corporafions ought
not to complain or ask any sympathy if the courts of the country
hold them to a strict compliance with the terms of the law under
which they claim immunity from pecuniary responsibility."
II. RIGHTS OF CREDITRs AGAINST STOCKHOLDERS WITH
RESPECT TO WATERED AND BONUS STOCK.
A creditor may seek to collect his debt on the basis of the
liability of the stockholder to pay the par value of his stock under
various circumstances: (1) Where an unpaid balance is due the
corporation upon his subscription contract; (2) where he has
received dividends out of capital assets; (3) where the shares
were issued as a bonus or at a discount with no contract to pay
more; (4) where the shares were issued as full paid in exchange
for property or services fictitiously valued, in other words for
a consideration diluted with water or blue sky.
It is important to observe that there are two sorts of obliga-
tion to pay up on stock not paid for dollar for dollar at the time
of issue. The first is a contractual obligation of the stockholder
to the corporation to pay the subscription price or any unpaid
installment thereof. It is clear that the "indebtedness of stock-
holders upon subscriptions to stock held by them is an indebted-
ness, not to the creditors of the corporation, but to the corpora-
tion itself. Such indebtedness is an asset of the corporation."1o
The second kind of obligation has a different basis. It is not
usually regarded as a contractual obligation or as an asset of the
corporation. It is an equitable obligation enforced by the courts
sCook 7 Am. Bar Ass'n Jnl. 534.
9(1909) 69 N.J. Eq. 36, 49, 61 At. 843.
mIn re. Peoples Livestock Insurance Co., (1893) 56 Minn. 180, 185, 57
N.W. 468; 5 Fletcher Corps. 3455.
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in favor of creditors where the corporation itself would have no
right, and contrary to the actual agreement of the stockholder.
It is the source or basis of this obligation to creditors to pay up
the par value of bonus or watered stock which it is difficult to
explain.
In First National Bank of Deadwood v. Gustin Minerva
Mining Co.,11 Justice Mitchell clearly points out the above distinc-
tion. If stockholders are indebted to the corporation for unpaid
installments on stock, this debt is an asset of the corporation
which, in case it becomes insolvent, any creditor may enforce
for the purpose of satisfying his claim. This might be by a
creditor's bill in the nature of an equitable execution. But where
stock is sold at a discount or is given away as full-paid, it is very
clear that the stockholder owes the corporation nothing. As be-
tween the corporation and the stockholder the arrangement by
which the stock is issued as full-paid stock is entirely valid.
Upon what ground is it then held that the arrangement, although
valid against the company, will be ineffectual against the
creditor? Upon what ground will equity hold the shareholder
liable to pay up the full par value, if necessary to satisfy the
debts of the corporation? What is the source of the equitable
right of the creditor to insist on a contribution of a greater
amount of capital by the shareholder than he has agreed to con-
tribute?
The New York courts deny that there is any such liability.
As is said in the case of Christianson v. Eno :12
"But the liability of a shareholder to pay for stock does not
arise out of his relation, but depends upon his contract, express
or implied, or upon some statute. . . We do not perceive how
a person to whom shares have been issued as a gratuity has, by
accepting them, committed any wrong upon creditors, or made
himself liable to pay the nominal face of the shares as upon a
subscription or .contract."
It seems then that by the law of New York (although recog-
nizing the trust fund doctrine) the subscription agreements are
the source and measure of the duty of the subscribers. 13
In an article entitled, The Trust Fund Theory -and some
Substitutes for It,'14 Mr. Edwin S. Hunt comes to the conclusion
11(1890) 42 Minn. 327, 6 L.R.A. 676, 44 N.W. 198, 18 A.S.R. 510.
12(1887) 106 N.Y. 97, 60 Am. Rep. 429.
lSSouthworth v. Morgan, (1912) 205 N.Y. 293, 98 N.E. 490.
1412 Yale L. J. 63, 81. See also Wickersham, The Capiltol of a Corpora-
tion, 22 Harv. L. Rev. 319, 322.
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that there is no principle of law or of equity upon which a
creditor can compel-a stockholder to pay more for his stock than
he has agreed to pay. He believes that the liability of stock-
holders beyond their agreements is a matter for statutory regu-
lation, in accordance with the New York view; that unissued
stock is not assets and that a person accepting shares as a gratu-
ity or at a discount has not injured the creditors, prior or sub-
sequent.
Most courts recognize that there is such a liability upon the
original holders of bonus or watered stock or their transferees
with notice."5 There is much difference of opinion, however, as
to the principle upon which this liability to creditors rests and
whether it should be limited to subsequent creditors without
notice. This liability has been accounted for on various theories;
first upon the trust fund theory originated by Judge Story in
1824 in the case of Wood v. Dummn er;'6 second, the fraud theory,
the presumed reliance of the creditor upon -the issued capital
stock of the corporation ;17 third, the co-debtor theory, to the
effect that the stockholders are in reality co-debtors up to the
limit set by the par value;8 and fourth, the prescribed obliga-
tion theory, that an obligation to contribute an amount equal to
the par value is imposed by operation" of law as an incident of
acquiring membership in a corporation."9
The trust fund theory is the one most commonly advanced.
As statdd in Farnsworth v. Robbins, ° a case involving the re-
lease of a subscriber and a discharge of his obligation to pay
upon surrender of his stock, "the capital stock of a corporation
contributed or agreed to be contributed by its 9tockholders, is in
equity and as to creditors, deemed a trust fund charged with the
payment of the debts of the corporation, and must be treated as
such by the corporation."'
25Wallace v. Carpenter, etc. Co., (1897) 70 Minn. 321, 73 N.W. 189, 65
A.S.R. 530.16(1824) 3 Mason (C.C.) 308, Fed. Cas. No. 17, 944.
'Hospes v. Northwestern Trust Co., (1892) 48 Minn. 174, 50 N.W. 1117,
31 A.S.R. 637, $1 L.R.A. 470.
1856 Univ. Penn. L.Rev. 57.
19Pepper, 34 Am. L. Reg. (N.S.) 448, 457; 29 Harv. Law Rev. 857;
Warren. 34 Harm. Law Rev. 287.
20(1887) 36 Minn. 369, 371, 31 N.W. 349. See also Ross v. Kelly, (1886)
36 Minn. 38.21Citing Upton v. Tribilcock, (1875) 91 U.S. 45, 23 L. Ed. 203; Sanger
v. Upton, (1875) 91 U.S. 56, 23 L.Ed. 220; Sawyer v. Hoag, (1873) 17
Wall. (U.S.) 610, 21 L.Ed. 731; Clapp v. Peterson, (1882) 104 Ili. 26;
Crandall v. Lincoln, (1884) 52 Conn. 73; Adler v. Milwaukee, etc., Mfg.
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In the case of Wood v. Dummer,22 in which a bank had
divided up two-thirds of its capital stock among its stockholders
without providing funds sufficient to pay its debts, Mr. Justice
Story pointed out that the charter of a corporation relieves the
stockholders from personal responsibility and substitutes the
capital stock in its stead. Credit is universally given to this fund
by the public as the only means of repayment. Accordingly
contributions cannot be withdrawn 'without payment of the debts.
The reason for the trust fund theory is well stated in Sanger
v. Upton.23
"The capital stock of an incorporated company is a fund set
apart for the payment of its debts. It is a substitute for the
personal liability which subsists in private co-partnerships . . .
The creditors have a lien upon it in equity. If diverted they may
follow it as far as it can be traced."
Mr. Justice Miller said in Sawyer v. Hoag :
"We think it now well established that the capital stock of a
corporation, especially its unpaid subscriptions, is a trust fund
for the benefit of the general creditors of the corporation."
The capital of a corporation may perhaps be regarded as a
trust fund in the sense that it cannot be diverted or distributed
among the stockholders without provision being first made for
full payment of corporate debts."5 As said by Mr. Pomeroy :26
"These statements may be sufficiently accurate as strong
modes of expressing the doctrine that such property is a fund
sacredly set apart for the payment of partnership and corpora-
tion creditors, before it can. be appropriated to the use of indi-
vidual partners or corporators."
The principal office of the trust fund doctrine is to preserve
the capital of a corporation as a fund for the payment of its
debts against withdrawal by stockholders.2 7  It fails to explain
the right of creditors where the corporation has no res to hold
in trust, no asset or right against the stockholder such as a con-
tract to pay the par value. A trust may be impressed upon un-
Co., (1860) 13 Wis. 57; 2 Morawetz. Corps. 780, 781, 790, 820. See
also Hatch v. Dana, (1879) 101 U.S. 205, 210, 25 L.Ed. 885; Scoville v.
Thayer, (1881) 105 U.S. 143, 26 L.Ed. 968; Camden v. Stuart, (1892) 144
U.S. 104, 36 L.Ed. 363, 12 S.C.R. 585.
22(1824) 3 Mason (C.C.) 308; 30 Fed. Cas. No. 17, 944.
23(1875) 91 U.S. 56, 23 L.Ed. 220.
24(1873) 17 Wall. 610, 21 L.Ed. 731.2
'Lebens v. Nelson, (1921) 148 Minn. 240, 245, 181 N.W. 350; Mackall v.
Pocock, (1917) 136 Minn. 8, L.R.A. 1917C 397, 161 N.W. 228.
263 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. 4th. Ed. Sec. 1046.27Upham v. Bramwell, (Or. 1922) 209 Pac. 100, 121; Mackall v. Pocock,(1917) 136 Minn. 8, 12, 161 N.W. 228, L.R.A. 1917C 390, 397, 399.
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paid subscriptions to stock, but where the stockholder is under
no subscription obligation to the corporation itself what is there
-for the corporation to hold in trust?28 Issuing shares wholly or
partly as a bonus is not a disposition of corporate assets like
paying dividends out of capital, because unissued stock is no
asset. The statement of authorized capital stock in the certifi-
cate creates merely authority to raise capital.
In the leading case of Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car
Co.,20 judge Mitchell in one of his most celebrated opinions, criti-
cized and in effect repudiated the trust fund theory at least
as the foundation of the stockholders' liability on watered
or bonus stock. He placed this liability on the basis of fraud,
actual or constructive. Prior to the Hospes case, as we have
seen, the Minnesota court had recognized the trust fund doctrine,
and for certain purposes, at least, particularly to prevent w'ith-
drawal of capital, it is no doubt still operative in this state.30
Both the trust fund and the fraud doctrines are recognized in
Illinois and enforced where applicable.
In the Hospes case the Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co., filed a
complaint in the insolvency proceedings pending against the
Northwestern Mfg. and Car Co., against one hundred or more
stockholders of the insolvent corporation to compel them to pay
to the receiver the face value of the common stock issued to them
as a bonus. In passing upon the nature and basis of the liability
of the holders of watered stock, Judge Mitchell denied the neces-
sity or expediency of inventing any such theory as the trust fund
doctrine.
According to Judge Mitchell the right of creditors to compel
holders of bonus stock to pay for it, contrary to their actual
agreement with the corporation, rests neither upon implied con-
tract nor upon any trust fund doctrine, but upon the ground of
fraud. The fraud consists in the misrepresentation as to the
actual amount of capital, upon the faith of which persons have
dealt with a corporation and given it credit. Since it is only
those creditors who have relied on, or who can fairly be pre-
280'Bear Jewelry Co. v. Volfer & Co., (1894) 106 Ala. 205, 17 So. 528,
28 L.R.A..707; 20 Harv. L. Rev. 401; 6 Fletcher, Corp. sec. 4095.
29(1892) 48 Minn. 174, 50 N:W. 1117. 31 A.S.R. 637, 51 L.R.A. 470.
30Farnsworth v. Robins, (1887) 36 Minn. 369, 371, 31 N.W. 350; Mackall
v. Pocock, (1917) 136 Minn. 8, 161 N.W. 228. In L.R.A. 1917C 397 the
annotator speaks of this case as a virtual abandonment of the attitude of
Justice Mitchell in the Hospes case, in other words a recognition of the
trust fund theory. Johnson v. Canfield-Swigart Co., (1920) 292 Ill. 101,
126 N.E. 608; 15 Ill. L. Rev. 217.
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sumed to have relied on, the stock representing actual capital,
who can claim an equity to enforce payment of such stock, pay-
ment can never be enforced in favor of one who became a
creditor before the bonus stock was issued. As to subsequent
creditors, it is also a matter of defense to show that the creditor
had knowledge of the arrangement by which the bonus stock
was issued, which negatives the presumption that he gave credit
on the faith of it.
In First National Bank of Deadzvood v. Gustin Minerva Min-
ing Co.,8 it was laid down by Judge Mitchell that:
"It is only those creditors who can fairly allege that they
have relied, or whom the law presumes to have relied, upon the
amount of capital stock of the company, who have a right to
make such inquiry, or in whose favor equity will impress a trust
upon the subscription to the stock, and set aside a fictitious ar-
rangement for its payment. . . Where corporations have organ-
ized and engaged in business with a certain amount of ostensible
and professed paidup capital, but which was not in fact paid in,
there are numerous cases in which the courts have set aside the
arrangement by which the stock was called 'paid-up,' and im-
pressed a trust upon the subscription of the shareholder in favor
of subsequent creditors who relied upon, or whom the law would
presume to have relied upon, the apparent and professed amount
of capital.
32
"If a corporation issue new shares after the claim of the
creditor arose, it is clear that the latter could not have dealt with
the company on the faith of any capital represented by them.
Whatever was contributed as capital in respect bf the new shares
was a clear gain to the creditor's security."
"So, too, if a party deals with a corporation with full knowl-
edge of the fact that its nominal paid-up capital has not in fact
been paid for in money or property to the full amount of its par
value, he deals solely on the faith of what has been actually paid
in and has no equitable right to insist on the contribution of a
greater amount of capital by the shareholder than the corpora-
tion itself could claim as part of its assets.1
3 3
This idea of fraud is again emphasized by Chief Justice Start
in Wallace v. Carpenter Electric Heating Mfg Co.,34 which was
an equitable action by judgment creditor to enforce payment of
31(1890) 42 Minn. 327, 333, 44 N.W. 198, 18 A.S.R. 510, 6 L.R.A. 676.
32Citing Sawyer v. Hoag, (1873) 17 Wall. 610, 21 L.Ed. 731; Wetherbee
v. Baker, (1882) 35 N.J.Eq. 501.33Citing Coit v. Gold Amal. Coal Co., (1882) 14 Fed. 12; affirmed 119
U.S. 343, 30 L.Ed. 420, 7 S.C.R. 231.
34(1897) 70 Minn. 321, 73 N.W. 189, 68 A.S.R. 530. See, also, Randall
Pr. Co. v. Sanitas Water Co., (1913) 120 Minn. 268, 139 N.W. 606;
Downer v. Unioi L. Co., (1911) 113 .Minn. 410, 416, 129 N.W. 777; State
Bank v. Kenny, etc., Co., (1919) 143 Minn. 236, 173 N.W. 560.
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his judgment by a stockholder of the debtor corporation on the
ground that its stock was fraudulently issued as fully paid up
when in fact it was not. Start C. J. declares that the issuing
of stock as fully paid up when in fact it is not, is a cheat and a
fraud which enables a corporation to obtain credit and property
by false pretenses and misrepresentation of its assets.
Probably the most important consequence of the fraud or
holding out theory is the limitation of the stockholders' liability
on watered or bonus stock to subsequent creditors without
notice. This limitation is observed in a majority of jurisdic-
tions. 5 But in some states the creditor may recover from the
stockholder even though he extended credit prior to the issue of
the stock or with full knowledge that the subscription was not
paid in full."' This result is usually based in part at least on
statutory construction. But it could also be reached as a matter
of common law if the right of the creditor is really derived
through an obligation owed to the corporation, and does not ac-
crue to the creditor directly upon a kind of tort liability in the
nature of deceit. It should be noted that the statutory double
liability is imposed both in favor of prior and subsequent
creditors.
In Easton National Bank v. American Brick & Tile Co.,3 7 it
is held that under the New Jersey General Corporation Act of
1875, a creditor's knowledge that stock was improperly issued
as "full paid" and as "issued for property purchased," when the
fact was otherwise, is not sufficient to debar him from relief
against recipients of the stock. As Pitney, J. says, if the only
foundation of the stockholders' liability to creditors is that of
35See Minn. cases cited above; also Sherman v. Harley, (1918) 178 Cal.
584, 174 Pac. 901, 7 A.L.R 950; Hill v. Silvey, (1888) 81 Ga. 500, 8 S.E.
808, 3 L.R.A. 151; First National Bank of Chanute v. Northrup, (1910)
82 Kan. 638. 109 Pac. 672, 136 A.S.R. 119; Scott v. Luehrman, (1919) 278
Mo. 638, 213 S.W. 855; Shields v. Clifton Hill Land Co., (1894) 94 Tenn.
123, 154, 28 S.W. 668 but see Jones v. Whitworth, (1895) 94 Tenn. 602,
30 S.W. 736; Gogebic Inv. Co. v. Iron Chief Co., (1891) 78 Wis. 427, 47
N.W. 726, 23 A.S.R. 417; Thompson, Corps, sec. 3945, 3983; 2 Morawetz,
Corporations sec. 829.36Easton National Bank v. American B. & T. Co., (1906) 70 N. J. Eq. 732,
64 Atl. 917, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 271; J. XV. Cooney Co. v. Arlington Hotel Co.,
(1917) 11 Del. Ch. 286, 101 At. 879, 890; Dupont v. Ball, (1918) 11 Del.
Ch. 430, 106 At. 39, 7 A.L.R. 955; Sprague v. National Bank, (1898) 172
Ill. 149, 50 N.E. 19, 42 L.R.A. 606, 64 A.S.R. 17; Gillett v. Chicago, etc.,
Co., (1907) 230 Ill. 373, 82 N.E. 891; Rosoff v. Gilbert Transportation Co.,(1915) 221 Fed. 972, (Under Conn. Statute).
37(1906) 70 N.J:Eq. 743, 64 At. 921, 10 Ann. Cas. 84, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.)
271. See Volney v. Nixon, (1905) 68 N.J.Eq. 605, 60 Atl. 189.
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having held out the issued stock as a source from which payment
might be expected, then it would not be irrational to debar from
any claim creditors whose claims accrued prior to the stock issue
in question, and subsequent creditors who had notice. But in
New Jersey, stockholders' liability upon watered stock does not
depend on the theory of fraud or "holding out." It depends
upon the stockholders' statutory obligation that the stock sub-
scription be made good for the benefit of creditors of insolvent
companies. The obligation is owed by the holders of watered
stock without distinction between prior and subsequent creditors,
or between creditors who have had notice and those who had none.
Watered stock, under whatever device, is absolutely alien to. the
statutory policy of the state, which prohibits that stock be issued
without the receipt of an equivalent in value.
It is submitted that the constructive fraud doctrine, as laid
down in the Hospes case and the subsequent Minnesota cases, is
no more sound or satisfactory as a basis for the stockholders'
liability than the trust fund doctrine. In the first place the
stockholder, by accepting a certificate of watered stock doesn't
make any actual representation to the creditor that he has paid
for the stock in full and it seems difficult to convict him of hav-
ing participated in any.38 As a general thing the creditor doesn't
know how much of the authorized capital stock has been
actually issued.
In the second place it seems a pure fiction to say, as Morawetz
and many courts have said, that the amount of capital stock is
fixed for the purpose of obtaining commercial credit by indicating
to the community what security has been provided for those who
deal with the corporation. 9 The amount of authorized capital
stock of a corporation is usually fixed partly with a view to the
maximum amount 6f capital to be raised by an issue of stock,
and partly in view of the organization and annual franchise
taxes which are levied on the basis of the amount of authorized
capital. According to the fraud theory each stockholder repre-
sents to every creditor that for each share of stock issued to him
100% par value has actually been paid into the treasury of the
company.
Various writers on non-par stock have clearly pointed out
that as a business reality the amount of outstanding stock pur-
3sSee Hunt, Trust Fund Theory, 12 Yale L. J. 63.39See 2 Morawetz, Corp. Sec. 781.
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porting to be fully paid up affects the question of corporate
credit very little, if at all. The time has gone by, if it ever ex-
isted, when creditors rely on the professed capitalization rather
than upon the real financial condition in extending credit.40
The fictitious basis of this fraud doctrine clearly appears
when we find that the supposed reliance of the creditor is pre-
sumed and that public policy requires that the fact whether a
particular creditor did or did not trust the corporation on that
basis should not be inquired into.4' It is apparent from this
that the rule is really based upon reasons of convenience, public
policy, and practical justice and that the supposed fraud is fraud
in law or imaginary fraud rather than actual fraud. In other
words it is merely a name for something else.
The capital stock of a corporation is the basis of its credit,
not because of actual reliance, by creditors on the precise amount
of stock issued, but because the contributions of the stockholders
are the substitute for their personal liability. It is not any mis-
representation of fact as to the amount of paid-in capital whieh is
the basis of liability, but the obligation imposed by law on the stock-
holder to contribute capital as an incident of membership in a
limited liability corporation. This obligation is in the nature of
an asset of the corporation and should be available to prior
creditors and to subsequent creditors with notice as well as to those
whose debts were contracted after the subscription without
notice. The law assures to those dealing with the company,
where the liability is limited, that the whole of the subscribed
capital shall remain available for the discharge of its liabilities,
except as diminished by losses and expenditures in the course of
business. Capital may be lost in carrying on the business and
the stockholder is not bound to replace it or keep it unimpaired
except in banks and financial corporations; but he cannot escape
his obligation to contribute by any fictitious arrangement with
the corporation or by withdrawing his contribution to the
prejudice of creditors.42
4OBank v. Belington Co., (1902) 51 W. Va. 60, 41 S.E. 390; State v.
Sullivan, (1920) 282 Mo. 261, 221 S.W. 728; 1 Machen, Corp. sec. 786;
Rice & Harno, Shares With No Par Value, 5 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW, 494.41Dwinnell v. Minn- F. & M. Ins Co., (1906) 97 Minn. 340, 347, 106 N.W.
312; Randall Printing Co. v. Sanitas Water Co., (1913) 120 Minn. 268,
139. N.W.. 606, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 706; R. H. Herron Co. v. Shaw, (1913)
165 Cal. 668, 133 Pac. 488, Ann. Cas. 1915A 1265.
42See Buck v. Ross, (1896) 68 Conn. 29, 31, 35 AtI. 763, 57 A.S.R. 60;
Handley v. Stutz, (1891) 139.U.S. 417, 35 L. Ed. 227, 11 S.C.R.- 530; Minn.
G.S. 1913, sec. 6193.
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The true theory of stockholders' liability upon watered and
bonus stock thus appears to be that of an obligation imposed by
law on original subscribers and purchasers with notice to make
a contribution to capital for the benefit of creditors as an incident
of membership in the corporation.43 On this theory the stock-
holder becomes liable without the aid of any fiction of reliance
by the creditor on the professed capital. It may be that in im-
posing such an obligation the courts have been doing legislative
work but it is in line with the general policy of the law as to
corporations. No one can justly expect to become a member of
a corporation and share in the profits of the enterprise without
taking some financial responsibility and contributing his share
of the capital. 44
As Judge Mitchel says in Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. &
Car Co. :4-
"The capital of a corporation is the basis of its credit. It is
a substitute for the individual liability of those who own its
stock. People deal with and give their credit on the faith of it.
They have a right to assume that it has paid in capital to the
amount it represents itself as having."
The law accordingly says to the would be stockholder:
"You are not entirely without responsibility for the debts of
this enterprise. You must make a contribution of capital to the
business to the par value of the stock issued to you as a burden
incident -to h6lding such stock, at least where needed to meet the
claims of creditors."
No better criterion or -standard of limited liability is to be
found ready-made than the par value of the stock, as it repre-
sents- the proportionate interest in the business and the propor-
tion in which the owner should contribute to pay the debts.
An issue of watered stock should be looked at as a double-
barrelled transaction: (1) A subscription to the stock, which
imposes an obligation to pay the par value; (2) a separate agree-
ment betweetn the subscriber and the corporation that the shares
shall be deemed fully paid for an inadequate equivalent, which
is to be regarded as a release or conveyance of the claim of the
corporation fraudulent as to creditors.
43See Pepper, 34 Am. L. Reg. (N.S.) 448, 457, 459.
"4Gordon v. Cummings, (1914) 78. Wash, 515, 139 Pac. 489; Holcombe v.
Trenton White City Co., (1912) 80 N.J.Eq. 122, 82 At1. 698.
45(1892) 48 Minn. 174, 197, 50 N.W. 1117. 31 A.S.R. 637, 15 LR.A. 470;
Wetherbee v. Baker, (1882) 35 N:J.Eq., 501, 511.
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While it is very true that the stockholder who takes stock at
fifty cents on the dollar does not defraud or do wrong to prior
creditors, but whatever he contributes is a clear gain to them,
still there is as much reason or justification for holding him upon
the obligation to pay up the balance of the par value for the
protection of prior as for the protection of subsequent creditors.
In reality he does no fraud or wrong to subsequent creditors
either. The obligation is a positive one imposed by law; it is an
asset of the corporation, in its true nature; and the release of
this obligation without fair equivalent, while valid against the
corporation, is in effect a fraudulent conveyance as against all
creditors in event of subsequent insolvency, because it deprives
the corporation of the prescribed basis of financial responsibility,
which is demanded by the policy of the law as the price of limited
liability. The duty to contribute is an asset of a corporation
which may be called a trust fund in the sense that the corpora-
tion cannot dispense with or release it as against creditors.
The obligation to contribute capital is theoretically not dis-
charged by fictitious payment. Very often, however, in order to
wash out of the watered or bonus stock the danger of liability
to pay up its par value to creditors in event 6f insolvency, the
organizers go through a solemn ceremony of legal hocus pocus
which is supposedly sufficient to deceive the fiction-loving eye
of the law, and which has become a part of the customary riga-
marole of corporate organization and stock issues.
The entire authorized capital stock is commonly issued to the
promoters by the dummy directors in payment for a mine, a
lease, an oil well, a patent, an option, or some other consideration
of uncertain value. The fiction consists in the determination by
the directors that the value of the property thus acquired is the
same as the par value of the stock issued in exchange for it. But
the fact that the promoter, as part of the transaction, graciously
donates back to the corporation as "treasury stock" a large por-
tion of the stock for which he has just paid in full, shows that
the valuation of the property is excessive. It is supposed that
the stock can now be sold to the public for less than par as fully
paid up and non-assessable, although upon an original issue a
liability would attach for the unpaid balance.
The question then arises, what showing will the courts re-
quire to set aside the arrangement as a fraud upon creditors? In
some jurisdiction the so called "true value rule" has been adopted
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by the courts. According to this rule, payment for capital stock
with property is no payment except to the extent of the true
value of the property. If property is taken at an overvaluation
the stockholder is liable to make up the deficiency and perform
his obligation to give money or money's worth to the full amount
of the par value of the stock taken. 46 In other jurisdictions a
more lenient standard called the "good faith rule," has been
adopted. By this rule the determination by the directors is con-
clusive unless fraud or intentional or reckless overvaluation can
be shown.
4 7
This rule seems to be the one adopted in Minnesota. In
Hastings Malting Co. v. Iron Range Brewing C9.,48 it is said.:
"The value of the property is to be determined, not from
subsequent events, but as of the time of the transaction, and
from the situation, nature, and condition of the property as they
honestly appeared to the parties at the time. Although there was
in fact an over valuation, it will not render the stockholders
liable for the deficiency if it was the result of an honest mistake
or error of judgment."
The test is whether the stockholder was justified in believing,
in the exercise of ordinary business sense, that the property was
being turned in at fair valuation. This will often turn on
whether the value of the property is capable of being readily
estimated or ascertained. In Randall Printing Co. v. Sanitas
Mineral Water Co, 4 9 it is said, "a corporation may in good faith
issue paid up shares for the purchase of property or for services
actually rendered." But equity will inquire into any fictitious
arrangement by which stock is issued as fully paid up as a fraud
on subsequent creditors without notice. In State Bank v. Kenny
etc. Co., it is said that :5'
"When stock is issued as fully paid upon a grossly inadequate
consideration in property transferred, stockholders receiving it
will be required to pay the difference between what they paid and
par if subsequent creditors who have actually or presumably
relied upon the stock as fully paid, require it for the satisfaction
of their debts."
46WM. E. Dee Co. v. Proviso Coal Co., (1919) 290 Ill. 252, 125 N.E. 24,
26; Lanz v. Moeller, (1913) 76 Wash. 429, 136 Pac. 687, 50 L.R.A. (N.S.)
68; 14 C.J. 961.47Coit v. Gold Amalgamating Co., (1886) 119 U.S. 343, 30 L. Ed. 420,
7 S.C.R. 231; 5 Fletcher, Corp. sec. 3576. Clinton Mining & Mineral Co.
v. Jamison, (1919) 256 Fed. 597, 167 C.C.A. 607; 14 C.J. 962.
,8(1896) 65 Minn. 28, 34, 67 N.W. 652.
49(1913) 120 Minn. 268, 274, 139 N.W. 606, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 706.
50(1919) 143 Minn. 236, 173 N.W. 560.
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In some jurisdictions additional stock may be issued by a
going concern at its market value irrespective of its par value, or
the corporation may issue bonus stock in aid of the sale of
bonds.51 Where money is contributed for stock to keep an em-
barrassed corporation going in the hope of paying its debts, it
would be clearly unjust to hold that creditors are entitled to
recover more than the amount agreed to be paid.5 2  So it has
been held that stock may be issued at its full market value to
pay corporate debts without obligation to pay up the par value.5 3
As Mr. Wickersham points out, if the creditors have the right
to rely upon the par value of issued stock, there would seem
to be no basis for a distinction between the original issue and any
subsequent issue. It is otherwise if it is an obligation to contri-
bute imposed by law, according to circumstances."
By the IMinnesota General Statutes, 1913, sec. 6193, it is pro-
vided "that no corporation shall issue any shares of stock for a
less amount to be actually paid in than -the par value of those first
issued." This statutory provision, enacted in 1866, leaves little
room for doubt that this market price exception to the obligation
of paying the par value could not be followed in Minnesota.
Bonds- on the other hand, apart from usury laws, may be sold
for less than face'value.55 Bondholders are not owners but credi-
tors of the enterprise. They do not enjoy the privilege of sharing
the profits with limited liability and so do not come under an
obligation to contribute a specified amount to the capital. Under
51Handley v. Stutz, (1891) 139 U.S. 447, 35 L. Ed. 227, 11 S.C.R. 530;
Thomas & Brenneman v. Goodman, (1918) 254 Fed. 39, 165 C.C.A. 391;
Courtney v. Georger, (1916) 228 Fed. 859, 143 C.C.A. 257; 3 MINNESOTA
LAW REvIEw 281; Wickersham, 22 Harv. Law Rev. 319,-331, Trust Fund
Theory, Pepper. 32 Am. Law Reg. (N.S.) 175; McMurtrie , 25 Am. L. Rev.
749, Thatcher, 25 Am. Law Review, 940.
52Weed etc., R. Co. v. Gainsville, (1904) 119 Ga. 596, 46 S.E. 895; Iowa
Drug Co. v. Souers, (1908), 139 Ia. 72, 117 N.W. 300, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.)
115, See Ann. Cas. 1915A 1271.
53Clark v. Bever, (1891) 139 U.S. 96, 110, 35 L. Ed. 88, 11 S.C.R. 468;
Fogg v. Blair, (1891) 139 U.S. 118, 35 L. Ed. 104, 11 S.C.R. 476, See
Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co., (1892) 48 Minn. 174, 197, 50
N.W. 1117, 31 A.S.R. 63 7, 15 L.R.A. 476.
5'Wallace v. Carpenter Electric Heating Mfg. Co., (1897) 70 Minn. 321,
73 M.W. 189, 68 A.S.R 530. See 3 MINNESOTA LAW R~vmw 281, Hospes
v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co., (1892) 48 Minn. 174, 197, 50 N.W. 1117,
31 A.S.R. 637, 51 L:R.A 470. See also 1 Machen, Corp. 631; 14 C. J. 959.
Enright v. Heckscher, .(1917) 240 JFed. 863, 153 C.C.A. 549; Donald v. Am.
Smeltirig & Refining Co., (1901) 62 N. J. Eq. 729, 48 Atl. 771, 1116.
55Clearwater County State Bank v. Bagley-Ogema Telephone Co., (1911)
116 Minn. 4, 133 N.W. 91, Ann. Cas. 1913A 622; Pueblo Foundry &
Machine Co. v. Lannon, (1920) 68 Colo. 131, 187 Pac. 1031.
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some statutes, however, bonds are declared void if issued at less
than a certain per cent of their face value.5 8
In the last few years twenty-three or more states and the
Dominion of Canada have adopted laws authorizing corporations
to be formed with stock having no stated par value.57 The great
popularity of this idea of non-par stock arouses a question whe-
ther it possesses more than legitimate attractiveness to those
interested in the promotion and organization of corporations. It
seems to be provided in all the statutes as to non-par stock that it
shall be deemed fully paid and non-assessable. The holder of the
shares is not liable to the corporation nor to the creditors on the
stock, no matter how little has been paid. This provision renders
inapplicable the great mass of law on stockholders' liability on
bonus and watered stock. Stock without par value can be issued
as fully paid for contracts, patents, mines, 'or promotion services.
This insures promoters and organizers against, liability to creditors
based on over-valuation of assets. It furnishes a very convenient
means of providing liberally for those who have promoted or
brought about the organization of the corporation.
Some possible objections to no-par stock which need more
careful attention than the present laws give, are: First, the ease of
inflation and the danger of manipulation by issuing large amounts
of stock for property of little value ;58 Second, the possibility of
frauds on investors by diluting the stock already issued by sub-
sequent issues at lower prices; theoretically the subscription price
of the stock should be uniform and equal; at least in the beginning
the subscriber should have some assurance that others will not
pay less than he is required to pay; Third, the absence of any
convenient basis of taxation for organization and franchise
taxes ;59 Fourth, the lack of sufficient protection to creditors, only
56In re Valecia Condensed Milk Co., (1916) 233 Fed. 173, 147 C.C.A.
183; Thompson, Corp. sec. 2241, 2246.57AIa. (1919) ; Cal. (1917) ; Colo. (1921); Del. (1917) ; Idaho (1921);
Ill. (1919); Kan. (1921); Me. (1917); Md. (1916); Mass. (1921); Mich.
(1921); Mo. (1921); N.H. (1919); N.J. (1920); N.Y. (1912); N.C.(1921) ; Okla. (1919) ; Pa. (1919); R.I. (1919) ; Utah (1921) ; Va. (1918);
W. Va. (1920) ; Wis. (1919) ; Canada, (1917).
The following states have issued licetises to admit foreign corporations
having shares without par' value to do business in the state. Ark., Colo.,
Fla., Md., Iowa., Ky., Minn., Mont., Nev., N. Dak., Ore., S. Dak., Tex., Vt.
The right to do business as a foreign corporation has been refused in six
states': Ga., Neb., N. Mex., S. Car., Tenn., and Washington. See Rice
& Harno, Non-Par Value Stock, 56 Am.'L. Rev. 329.
58Cook, 19 Mich. L. Rev. 583, 592; 7 Am. Bar Assn. 534.
1"Pierson, Stock Having No Par Value, 17 Ill. L. Rev. 173, 184.
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a small amount of capital usually being required to be paid in as
a basis of financial responsibility at the start, with no provision
for increase later.
The principal arguments advanced in favor of no-par stock
are:
1. That the par value is misleading to investors. It is sup-
posed that misrepresentation or misunderstanding arises through
the difference between the actual value and the par value. Some
writers seem to labor under the misapprehension that it is the doc-
trine of the law that the assets or capital of the corporation shall
at all times equal the face value of the stock, and that the par
value of the stock is an index to the assets of the corporation. 0
That, however, is only the case with banks and financial corpora-
tions. Shares are supposed to represent membership based on
specified sums of money contributed to capital. The par value
of issued stock is not supposed to be the index of the financial
condition for the information of investors and creditors and is
probably not relied upon as such. No doubt inexperienced per-
sons are sometimes misled into subscribing for stock at a dis-
count or taking it as a bonus with no idea of the liabilities thereby
incurred.
2. A more substantial argument is that some method should
be provided to give an interest in the profits to persons concerned
as founders and organizers, regardless of the actual contribution
in money or property which they make to the corporation's capital.
Capital isn't everything in a corporation any more than in a
partnership. At present this can be accomplished only by subter-
fuge and indirection.
3. It is desirable that a going concern should be able to increase
its capital by a new issue of stock, to be sold at the market price,
rather than to be compelled to increase its fixed charges by an
issue of bonds if the stock has fallen below par. It ought to be
possible also to give a bonus of common stock with bonds or pre-
ferred stock to add a speculative attraction to the investment.
4. A strong argument in favor of the no-par stock would
seem to be that the performance of the obligation to pay the par
value of stock is usually fictitious. The courts apply more or
less uncertain tests to determine the liability of the stockholder
6ORice & Harno, Shares With No Par Value, 5 MINNESOTA LAW
REm'MW 493, 497; 56 Am. L. Rev. 321, Thompson, Corporations, 1922 Sup-
plement, Sec. 3447; Morawetz, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 729.
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when the creditors call upon him to pay the difference between the
face value of the stock and the value of property transferred. The
liability of the stockholder is thus left in doubt and uncertainty.
The attempt to enforce proper contributions of capital and to safe-
guard creditors in this manner is largely a failure and should per-
haps be abandoned in favor of something else. The amount of
capital which a corporation must have as a basis of financial
responsibility may be fixed without reference to the number of
shares issued, by an amount to be stated in the charter or articles
of incorporation. The present non-par laws, however, seem very
inadequate in this regard.
There may be some doubt, in view of the Minnesota constitu-
tional double liability provision that "stockholders in any corpora-
tion, excepting those organized for the purpose of carrying on
any kind of manufacturing or mechanical business, shall be liable
to the amount of stock held or owned by them," whether it is possi-
ble for the legislature of this state to provide for no-par stock.
The difficulty might perhaps be met if the statute should provide
that "the amount of the stock" for purposes of stockholder's
liability, but for no other purpose, should be taken to be of the
par value of $100 per share." It has recently been held, however,
that a statute which places a value of $100 per share on stock of
no par value, for purposes of taxation, is unconstitutional, as
arbitrary, discriminatory, and unequal. 60 a
III. RIGHTS OF CREDITORS AGAINST STOCKHOLDERS BY REASON OF
CONSTITUTIONAL OR DOUBLE LIABILITY
Statutes and constitutional provisions have been adopted in
some states for the purpose of providing a security for creditors
in addition to the security furnished by the company's capital.
Statutes providing that stockholders shall be liable to the par
value of their stock impose little more liabiity than would exist in
equity. Statutes imposing an additional liability to an amount
equal to the par value of the stock, that is a double liability, are
now rare except in the case of banks. In California a peculiar
statutory liability is imposed for each debt in proportion to the
amount or value of the stock held.61 In some states individual
6 &oaPeople x rel. Walsh v. Tax Commissioners, (App. Div. N. Y. 1922)
1.95 N.Y.S. 184; See also People ex rel. v. Mensching, (1907) 187 N.Y. 8.,
79 N.E. 884, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 625, 10 Ann. Cas. 101.
61Sacramento Bank v. Pacific Bank, (1889) 124 Cal. 147, 56 Pac. 787,
71 A.S.R. 36.
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liability is imposed upon stockholders until the entire or a specified
amount of the capital stock has been paid in; .in others there is a
liability for particular debts such as those due laborers; by some
statutes penal liabilities are imposed for failure to file reports or
otherwise comply with the requirements of the corporation laws.6 2
It is the policy of Minnesota as expressed in our present con-
stitution, that stockholders of corporations should be individually
liable to a limited amount and that the measure of such liability
should be a sum equal to the par value of the stock owned or
held by them. Mr. Justice Miller, of the United States Supreme
Court, speaking of the distinction between joint stock companies
and corporations, said in 1870 :64
"The principle of personal liability of the shareholders attaches
to a very large proportion of the corporations of this country, and
is a principle which has warm advocates for its universal applica-
tion when the organization is for pecuniary gain."
This is certainly no longer the attitude of those who make the
corporation laws of this country. The great advantage of incor-
poration is the exemption of the stockholder from individual
liability, except for the par value of the stock held. When this is
once paid there is at common law no further liability. Double or
superadded liability by statute is common in case of banks, but
as to other classes of corporations it has become exceptional. The
policy of American corporation law at the present day is to en-
courage enterprise, and to favor the interests of the investor as
against the creditor.
As Cook says :65
"This class of statutes, except in the case of banks, have proved
signal failures. They drive corporations from the state, are rarely
relied upon by creditors, and are productive of interminable liti-
gation."
Business men may well hesitate to incorporate large or specula-
tive enterprises in Minnesota and incur the risk that the stock-
holders will be held as guarantors to creditors in case of failure.
When the incorporation is applied for in another state no such
liability will be incurred. Stockholders of a foreign corporation
623 Clark & Marshall, Corps. sec. 806; Minn. G.S. 1913. 6178-2; 4 C. J.
Corp. p. 980. Natl. New Haven Bank v. Northwestern Guaranty Loan Co.,
(1895) 61 Minn..375, 63 N.W. 1079.
"aWillis v. Mabon, (1892) 48 Minn. 140, 149, 50 N.W. 1110.6 4Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Mass., (1870) 10 Wall. (U.S.) 566, 9 L. Ed. 1029;
quotedb -y Lurton J. in Andrews Bros. Co.. v. Youngstown Coke Co., (1898)
86 Fed. 585.65Stock and Stockholders, sec. 215.
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doing business here escape this double liability altogether, being
subject only to such liability as is imposed by the state of incor-
poration. We thus favor the stranger within our gates and lose
the benefit of large incorporation fees, regulatory power and the
convenience of domestic incorporation owing to dangerous and
unusual liabilities not imposed on stockholders of foreign corpor-
ations.
Section 3, article 10 of the Minnesota constitution provides:
"Each stockholder in any -corporation, excepting those organ-
ized for the purpose of carrying on any kind of manufacturing or
mechanical business, shall be liable to the amount of stock held
or owned by him."
The effect of this provision is stated as follows by the United
States Supreme Court :66
"The provision is self-executing, and under it each stockholder
becomes liable for the debts of the corporation in an amount
measured by the par value of his stock. This liability is not to the
corporation but to the creditors collectively, is not penal but con-
tractual, is not joint but several, and the mode and means of its
enforcement are subject to legislative regulation."8 17
The constitutional amendment of 1872 excepted the stock-
holders of manufacturing and mechanical corporations from the
personal liability imposed by article 10, section 3, of the constitu-
tion upon stockholders of all corporations. The purpose of this
amendment, as stated by Justice Mitchell, was to encourage manu-
facturing enterprises by exempting those in.vesting their capital
in that business from personal liability.88 It was held that to
extend this exemption to corporations combining manufacturing
with some other distinct and independent business wpuld defeat
the object of the amendment of 1872 and also nullify the consti-
tutional provision imposing liability on the stockholders of all
but manufacturing and mechanical corporations.
As is said by Brown, C. J.;69
"
6 Converse v. Hamilton, (1912) 224 U. S. 243, 253, 255, 56 L Ed. 749,
32 S.C.R. 415.
67Citing: Willis v. Mabon, (1892) 48 Minn. 140, 50 N.W. 1110, 31
A.S.R. 626, 16 L.R.A. 281; Minneapolis Baseball Co. v. CityBank, (1896)66 Minn. 441, 446, 69 N.W. 331; Hanson v. Davison, (1898) 73 Minn.
454, 76 N.W. 254; Straw & Ellsworth Mfg. Co. v. Kilbourne Boot & Shoe
Co., (1900), 80 Minn. 125, 83 N.W. 36; London & North West American
Mortgage Co. v. St. Paul Park Improvement Co., (1901) 84 Minn. 144,
86 N.W. 872; Bernheimer v. Coiverse, (1907) 206 U.S. 516, 51 L. Ed.
1163, 27 S.C.R. 755.
"State ex rel. Clapp v. Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co., (1889) 40 Minn.
213, 222, 41 N.W. 1020, 3 L.R.A. 510.
"Graff v. Minnesota Flint Rock Co., (1920) 147 Minn. 58, 179 N.W. 562.
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"If the corporation under the authority reserved to it by its
articles of incorporation, lawfully may engage in any business or
occupation other than manufacturing, not incidental to nor allied
therewith, the constitutional exemption from liability does not
apply. . . A manufacturer is one who by labor, art, or skill
transforms raw material into some kind of a finished product or
article of trade."
As stated by Judge Mitchell in another case :70
"If the corporation is organized for the purpose, as declared
in the articles of association, of carrying on both a manufacturing
business and also some other kind of business not properly inci-
dental to or necessarily connected with a manufacturing business,
the mere fact that the corporation never exercised all its corporate
powers, and never in fact engaged in or carried on anything but a
manufacturing business, will not bring the case within the con-
stitutional exception."
A "mechanical business," within the meaning of the constitu-
tional exception, is one incidental to or closely allied with some
kind of manufacturing business. It is held that the mining of
iron ore is such a mechanical business and the stockholder of a
corporation organized for that purpose is exempt from the stock-
holder's double liability.7 1  But a corporation authorized by its
articles to speculate in mineral lands, in addition to the power to
mine and work ores, is not organized for the purpose of an
exclusively mechanical business.7 2
The fact that a manufacturing corporation engages in a line of
business not authorized by the articles of incorporation, does not
subject the stockholders to double liability.73 What the situation
would be, however, if a corporation were organized for the very
purpose of evasion of the law as a manufacturing company, if
only a trifling part of the business actually transacted were manu-
facturing, and the real object of the organization was the carrying
on of some other kind of business such as buying and selling, has
not been settled as yet by the decisions of this state.74
Corporations which "embrace banking privileges" are excepted
from the operation of article 10, section 3 of the constitution by
article 10, section 1. But it is held that stockholders of a banking
70Arthur v. Willius, (1890) 44 Minn. 409, 415, 46 N.W. 851.
?'Cowling v. Zenith Iron Co., (1896) 65 Minn. 263, 68 N.W: 48, 60 A.S.R.
471, 33 L.R.A. 508.72Anderson v. Anderson, (1896) 65 Minn. 281, 68 N.W. 49; 33 L.RLA.
510.73Nicollet Nat Bank v. Frisk Turner Co., (1898) 71 Minn. 413, 74 N.W.
160, 70 A.S.R. 334.74See M.fohr v. Minnesota Elevator Co., (1889) 40 Minn. 343, 346, 41
N.W. 1074; Arthur v. Willius, (1890) 44 Minn. 409, 416, 46 N.W. 851.
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corporation organized under the laws of this state, which is not a
bank of issue or circulation, are liable under article 10, section 3,
for the debts of the corporation. The clause, "except such as em-
brace banking privileges" refers only to banks of issue or circula-
tion whose stockholders are made liable by article 9, section 13 .7
The constitutional liability, which constitutes a reserve or trust
fund for the benefit of creditors, is not discharged by the payment
of an assessment upon bank stock levied pursuant to orders given
by the public examiner on account of an impairment of the bank's
capital, and to enable it to re-open its doors and continue its bank-
ing business.7 6
The methods of avoiding stockholders' liability are: First,
to organize as a manufacturing or mechanical corporation; Sec-
ond, to issue only a few shares of low par value and to capitalize
the corporation by an issue of bonds secured by mortgage. This
will have the advantage of giving the owners priority over general
creditors; also the bonds may be deducted from property in a
statement of tangible property, or the interest from income, and
thus bring about a reduction of taxes.7 7  The third and usual
method is to incorporate in another state such as South Dakota,
where the taxes are low, and either do business in Minnesota as a
foreign corporation or organize a small local operating company
with a nominal capitalization as local agent.
The nature of the constitutional liability of stockholders is
described in Northwestern Trust Co. v. Bradburyfg as being
"for all practical purposes a reserve or trust fund, to be resorted
to only in proceedings for liquidation, when necessary to meet the
obligations of the corporation. It is limited to an amount equal
to the par value of the stock held and owned by each stockholder,
and exists in favor of the cieditors collectively, not severally, and
in proportion to the amount of their respective claims against the
corporation. No single creditor can enforce payment of his debt
against any one or more of the stockholders, because he has no
several or independent right to the fund."
It follows from this that:
"A stockholder cannot, by the voluntary payment of the full
quota of his liability to a particular creditor or set of creditors,
75Northwestern Trust Company v. Bradbury, (1910) 112 Minn. 76, 127
N.W. 386; International Trust Company v. American Loan & Trust
Company, (1895) 62 Minn. 501, 65 N.W. 78, 632; Allen v. Walsh, (1879)
25 Minn. 543, 541.76Northwestern Trust Company v. Bradbury, (1912) 117 Minn. 83, 134
N.W. 513, Ann. Cas. 1913D 69.77Conyngton, Corp. Procedure sec. 93.
78(1912) 117 Minn. 183, 134 N.W. 513.
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discharge his further responsibility. . .Ek trust fund designed
for the benefit of all creditors would be thus unfairly distributed,
and those most deserving, perhaps, deprived of the benefit the law
intended to confer upon them."
The constitutional liability of stockholders does not depend
upon presumed reliance or estoppel but extends to present as well
as to future creditors, unlike liability upon watered or bonus
stock.79 The stockholder is liable as long as he holds his stock,
although he may have a right of action to rescind his stock sub-
scription if induced by fraud of the corporation. 0 It has been
held that a renewal of a certificate of deposit by the issue of a rew
one in lieu thereof, after transfer of bank stock, creates a new
debt and relieves the former stockholder from his liabiity.1
When a corporation is declared insolvent and goes into the hands
of a receiver all corporate debts mature. The stockholders' liabil-
ity becomes fixed as of that date for whatever deficiencies then
exist; the cause of action then accrues so as to set the statute of
limitations running.
2
Under the laws of California a stockholder of a domestic or
foreign corporation is liable for his proportion of the debts of a
corporation as a principal and not as a surety. The California
constitutional provision makes the liability of the stockholder that
proportion of the creditor's total claim which the amount of
stock owned by the shareholder at the time the debt was con-
tracted bears to the whole subscribed capital stock.83 The Cali-
fornia statute imposes a primary and direct liability to the credi-
tor which can be enforced in an action against the stockholder
independent of any judgment against the corporation. The stock-
holder is liable individually, as a principal debtor, not as a surety
or guarantor.84
The Minnesota statute on the other hand imposes a secondary
liability to contribute to a fund to be distributed by a court of
equity among the creditors equally. The stockholders are in the
position of sureties or guarantors for the debts of the corpora-
79Olson v. Cook, (1894) 57 Minn. 552, 561, 59 N.W. 635; First National
Bank v. Winona Plow Co., (1894) 58 Minn. 167, 59 N.W. 997.
8GBartlett v. Stephens, (1917) 137 Minn. 213, 163 N.W. 288.81Seymour v. Bank of Minnesota, (1900), 79 Minn. 211, 81 N.W. 1059.
Compare L.R.A. 1915B 168 n.
82Shearer v. Christy, (1917) 136 Minn. 111, 114, 161 N.W. 498.
3Gardner v. Bank of Napa, (1911) 160 Cal. 177, 117 Pac. 667.
8 4Ellsworth v. Bradford, (1921) 199 Pac. 335.
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tion. 5 The discharge of the corporation in bankruptcy does not
extinguish the debt or release the surety from liability.
It seems that the stockholder's constitutional liability is second-
ary to the liability upon watered or bonus stock. In Hosford v.
Cuyuna Minneapolis Iron Co. 6 one contention was that the pri-
mary liability of stockholders who paid the corporation nothing or
less than par for the stock they had obtained, had not been taken
into consideration. It was also contended that all persons who
obtained any of the stock without paying for it in full should be
compelled to pay for it before the stockholders' liability was
enforced. Lees, C., says "there seems to be substantial basis for
this assertion," but it was held that the court was justified- in
assessing the stockholders unless the corporate assets available
were clearly sufficient to pay the corporate debts in full and with-
out delay and that the assessment should stand unless palpably
beyond all reasonable necessity. It would seem that the statu-
tory liability is the ultimate resource of the creditors, the last
resort, and that the assets of the corporation, including the liability
of the stockholder to pay for his shares in full, are primarily liable
for the corporate debts.
8 7
In general where a stockholder makes a complete sale and
transfer of his stock, and the transfer is duly registered, a nova-
tion or substitution is produced and the transferee is the one
liable for future calls for the unpaid balance due on the stock.8
The stockholders' liability for unpaid subscriptions does not con-
tinue after he has transferred the.stock, except when the transfer
was made for the purpose of defrauding creditors.8 9 But if the
transfer is made without consideration after the company has
become insolvent this makes out a prima facie case of fraud upon
creditors.90
85Way v. Barney, (1911) 116 Minn. 285, 133 N.W. 801, Ann. Cas. 1913A
719.
86(Minn. 1922) 189 N.W. 1025.
87See also Dupont v. Ball, (1918) 11 Del. Ch. 430, 106 At. 39, 7 A.L.R.
955; Weil v. Defenback, (1918) 31 Idaho 258, 170 Pac. 103; Peter v. tinion
Mfg. Co., (1897) 56 Ohio St. 181, 202.
88Basting v. Northern Trust Co., (1895) 61 Minn. 307, 311, 63 N.W. 721;
14 C. J. 780, See Axford v. Western Inv. Co., (1918) 141 Minn. 412, 423,
168 N.W. 97, 170 N.W. 587.
891n re Peoples Livestock Insurance Co., (1894) 56 Minn. 180, 186, 57
N.WA. 468.
90McConey v. Belton Oil Gas Co., (1906) 97 Minn. 190, 198, 106 N.W.
900.
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A transferee of under-paid stock who doesn't participate in
the transaction whereby the stock was issued and who purchases
the stock on a representation by the corporation that the stock
is fully paid cannot be held liable to creditors of the corporation
for the difference between the price paid and the par value of the
stock.", Whether on the fraud theory a transferee with notice can
be held on bonus or underpaid stock to a creditor who became such
after the issue of the stock, but prior to the transfer, query?
A shareholder in a corporation cannot escape his constitutional
liability for the debts of the corporation even by a bona fide sale
of the stock to a solvent party and a transfer on the books of the
corporation.9 2  Nor can he escape by selling or surrendering his
stock to the corporation.13 After transfer of the stock the liability
rests primarily upon the transferee. While the transferor is not
released from liability from the then existing debts of the cor-
poration, his liability, thereafter, becomes secondary to that of
the transferee, and the liability of both is secondary to that of the
corporation. A valid extension of time for payment granted by
a creditor to the corporation without the consent of the stock-
holder who has previously transferred his stock operates to re-
lease such stockholder from his liability as surety for the debt,
but the burden is upon the stockholder to show that such extension
was made without his consent.9 4
IV. METHOD OF ENFORCEMENT.
1. Statutory or Double Liability. The statutes give the indivi-
dual creditor no right of action against the individual stockholder.
Since the decision in Allen v. Walsh, 95 the law applicable to the
enforcement of the constitutional liability has been settled, that
the only remedy is by proceedings brought in behalf of all the
creditors and that this, being the remedy prescribed by statute, is
exclusive.9 The proper form of action in which to enforce the
9'Rhode v. Dock Hop Co., (1920) 184 Cal. 367, 194 Pac. 11, 12 Am. L R.
437, 449; Bowen v. Imperial Theaters Inc., (Del. Ch. 1922) 115 Att. 918.
See Warren, 34 Har.. L. Rev. 287; 9 Cal. L. Rev. 238.92Minn. G.S. 1913, sec. 6177, Tiffany v. Gieson, (1905) 96 Minn. 448, 105
N.W. 901; Gunnison v. U.S. Investment Co., (1897) 70 Minn. 292, 73 N.W.
149; Selig v. Hamilton, (1914) 234 U.S. 652, 659, 58 L. Ed. 1518, 34 S.C.R.
926, Ann. Cas. 1917A 104.93Lebens v. Nelson, (1921) 148 Minn. 240, 181 N.W. 350; 14A C. 3. 280.94Way v. Mooers, (1917) 135 Minn. 339, 160 N.W. 1014. See also
Harier v. Carroll, (1896) 66 Minn. 487, 502, 503, 69 N.W. 610, 1069.
95(1879) 25 Minn. 543, 553.96Northwestern Trust Co. v. Bradbury, (1912) 117 Minn. 83, 89, 134
N.W. 513; McKusick v. Seymour, (1892) 48 Minn. 158, 170,50 N.W 1114;
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double liability of stockholders is sequestration proceedings under
what was formerly chapter 76. Prior to the revision of 1905 the
statutes relating to sequestration proceedings and the enforcement
of stockholders' liability are found in chapter 76, of the various
editions of the statutes.9 7  The plaintiff must be a judgment
creditor who has exhausted his legal remedies by having an execu-
tion against the corporation returned unsatisfied. The court may
in this proceeding sequestrate the property of the corporation,
appoint a receiver, and upon final judgment order the property or
its proceeds to be distributed proportionately among the creditors.
This is in its nature an equitable action in behalf of all the creditors
against the corporation and its stockholders, wherein the debts of
the corporation are determined and after exhausting the corporate
assets, the liability of the stockholders for any deficiency may be
adjudicated and enforced.9 8 In McKusick v. Seymour, Sabin &
Co.,9 9 it was pointed out that the stockholders may only be com-
pelled to contribute the deficiency, which can only be estimated
after the corporate assets are all distributed among the creditors,
which has to be done in the sequestration proceeding, if one is
pending. Judge Mitchell says:
"It is entirely consistent with the established equity jurisdiction
and in accordance with established equity practice, to forestall a
multiplicity of actions by bringing all the litigation into its grasp
in one suit for a general accounting and a complete adjustment of
all rights.... In fact it is only by sequestrating the corporate
assets and enforcing this liability of stockholders in the same
proceeding that results equally just and equitable to all parties
can be worked out."
Whatever is realized in such a proceeding belongs to all the
creditors, or at least to all that class of creditors entitled to parti-
cipate in the fund, and will be in the custody of the court and dis-
tributed by it, or by the receiver under its direction.
Hanson v. Davison, (1898) 73 Minn. 454, 76 N.W. 254; Harper v. Carroll,(1896) 66 Minn. 487. 69 N.W. 610, 1069; Johnson v. Fischer, (1883) 30
Minn. 173, 14 N.W. 799; Mpls. Baseball Co. v. City Bank, (1896) 66 Minn.
441, 69 N.W. 331.
97See Minn. R. L. 1905 secs. 3169, 3183, Minn. G.S. 1913 secs. 6634 ff;
Dnnnel's Digest sec. 2144.
9SHanson v. Davison, (1898) 73 Minn. 454, 76 N.W. 254; McKusick v.
Seymour, Sabin & Co., (1892) 48 Minn. 158, 50 N.W. 1114; Winnebago
Paper Mills Co. v. Northwestern Printing. etc., Co., (1895) 61 Minn. 373,
63 N.W. 1024; Parten v. Southern Col. Co., (1920) 146 Minn. 287, 178
N.W. 744.
99(1892) 48 Minn. 158, 50 N.W. 1114.
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The enforcement of stockholder's liability for corporate debts
in sequestration proceedings is now regulated by a statute enacted
in 1899.100 This statute provides a method for the enforcement of
any kind of liability, constitutional, statutory, or otherwise, upon
a petition by a receiver or assignee of a corporation or of any
creditor thereof whose claim has been filed. The statute provides
for due notice by publication or otherwise, for a general inquiry
into the question whether the available assets will be sufficient to
pay the expenses of the proceedings and the indebtedness in full
and without delay, and for a ratable assessment upon all parties
liable as stockholders for such amount or percentage of such
liability upon each share of stock as it shall deem proper. The
order is to authorize and direct the assignee or receiver to collect
the amount so assessed and upon failure of payment by any stock-
holders to prosecute an action against them whether resident or
non-resident and wherever found.
Proceedings under sec. 6646, Minn. G. S. 1913 upon petition
for an assessment against the stockholders of an insolvent cor-
poration are summary and informal. The statute provides that
the court shall consider evidence bearing upon the following
points: (1) The nature and probable extent of the indebtedness
of the corporation; (2) the probable expense of the receivership;
(3) the probable amount of available assets; and (4) the persons
liable as stockholders, the nature and extent of their liability, and
their probable solvency or responsibility; and therefrom deter-
mine the propriety and necessity of the proposed assessment.
The question is to be determined by the probability of the case.' 0 1
The assessment is but the foundation for the proceedings sub-
sequently to be brought for collection if voluntary payment be not
made. If a surplus remains after payment of debts and expenses
it is returned to the stockholders. 02
The proceeding on the petition by the receiver or creditor for
an assessment on the stockholders is not an independent suit but
is simply a further step in the original sequestration proceedings. 03
The proceedings have two stages; (1) the taking of an account
'
0OLaws 1899 C. 272, Minn. R. L. 1905 secs. 3184, 3190, Minn. G.S. 1913,
sec. 6645 ff. Way v. Barney, (1911) 116 Minn. 285, 294, 133 N.W. 801.
'
0
'Hosford v. Cuyuna Mpls. Iron Co., (Minn. 1922) 189 N.W. 1025
'
02See generally Straw & Ellsworth Co., v. L. D. Kilbourne, etc., Co.,(1900) 80 Minn. 125, 83 N.W. 36; Van Slyck v. Vanasek, (1916) 132 Minn.
9, 155 N.W. 754.
103Ueland v. Haugan, (1897) 70 Minn. 349, 73 N.W. 169.
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and the levying of an assessment upon the stockholders; and
(2) the collection of the assessment by individual suits by the
receiver.
It is said that the proceeding is not materially different from
that authorized by the National Banking Act, except that under
the latter the assessment is made by the comptroller of the cur-
rency, while here the assessment is made by the court. 0 4
The order of assessment is, under sec. 6647 G. S. 1913, con-
clusive upon all of the stockholders as to all matters relating to
the amount, propriety, and necessity of the assessment. No person
is deprived by the finding however, of opportunity of showing that
he is not a stockholder, or that he holds less stock than found, or
that he has a set-off available or has any other defence personal to
himself. 0 5 The conclusive effect of the court's order is not
dependent on the personal appearance or joinder of the stock-
holders because they are represented by the corporation. 01  There
is no difference between a suit against a stockholder for an unpaid
subscription and a claim against him on his superadded liability,
so far as the conclusiveness of the assessment is concerned. 0 7
An ancillary action may be prosecuted in another state, if
necessary, by the receiver appointed to collect and distribute the
fund arising fro*m the stockholders' liability in the sequestration
proceedings. 08 It is the duty of the courts of other states under
the full faith and credit clause to give effect to the orders of the
Minnesota courts in making assessments on stockholders, although
the stockholders were not personally made parties to the suits in
which the orders were made. 10 9
'
04Straw & Ellsworth Co. v. L. D. Kilbourne, etc., Co., (1900) 80 Minn.
125, 83 N.W. 36; Conflict of Laws and Statutory Liability, Abbot, 23 Harv.
L. Rev. 37, 43.
'
05Neff v. Lamm, (1906) 99 Minn. 115, 108 N.W. 849. Selig v. Hamilton,
(1914) 234 U.S. 652, 659, 58 L. Ed. 1518, 34 S.C.R. 926; Hanson v. Davi-
son, (1898) 73 Minn. 454, 76 N.W. 254; Harrison v. Carman, (1921) 149
Minn. 365, 183 N.W. 826; Abbot, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 37, 44.
'
06Marin v. Augedahl, (1918) 247 U.S. 142, 62 L. Ed. 1038, 38 S.C.R.
452.
07Hanson v. Davison, (1898) 73 Minn. 454, 462, 76 N.W. 254.
'
08Hale v. Hardon, (1899) 95 Fed. 747; I-anson v. Davison, (1898) 73
Minn. 454, 76 N.W. 254.
io9Bernheimer v. Converse, (1907) 206 U.S. 516, 528, 51 L. Ed. 1163, 27
S.C.R. 755; Converse v. Hamilton, (1912) 224 U.S. 243, 56 L. Ed. 749, 32
S.C.R. 415; Selig v. Hamilton, (1914) 234 U.S. 652, 58 L. Ed. 1518, 34
S.C.R. 926, Ann.. Cas. 1917A 104; Matin v. Augedahl, (1918) 247 U.S.
142, 62 L. Ed. 1038, 38 S.C.R. 452.
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The receiver, as statutory representative of the creditors may
sue in aid of the parent proceeding in another state. As is said
in Converse v. Hamilton.110
"Under this statute, as interpreted by the supreme court of
the state, as also by this court, the receiver is not an ordinary
chancery receiver or arm of the court appointing him, but a quasi-
assignee and representative of the creditors, and when the order
levying the assessment is made he becomes invested with the
creditors' rights of action against the stockholders and with full
authority to enforce the same in. any court of competent jurisdic-
tion in the state or elsewhere."'
2. Bonus and Underpaid Stock. The stockholder's liability on
bonus and underpaid stock, like the liability on unpaid subscrip-
tions and like double liability, is in general regarded as a fund for
the equal benefit of all the creditors entitled to enforce it. They
are, as it were, tenants in common of the amount unpaid on the
par value of the stock and the amount still due should be appor-
tioned among them all like a trust fund. Accordingly, the proper
remedy for its enforcement would seem to be an equitable proceed-
ing in which all persons interested may be joined and their res-
pective rights, equities, and liabilities adjusted and determined
after a proper accounting.":
2
Where the liability of stockholders to corporate creditors in-
volves a fund for the benefit of all creditors in proportionate
shares, the remedy naturally belongs to a court of equity." 3
It has been held that payment for bonus stock may be enforced
in sequestration proceedings just as the constitutional liability is
enforced. 14 An action to enforce payment for stock issued for
an inadequate consideration may be joined with an application
110(1912) 224 U.S. 243, 56 L. Ed. 749, 32 S.C.R. 415.
"'Straw & Ellsworth Co. v. L. D. Kilbourne, etc., Co., (1900) 80 Minn.
125, 83 N.W. 36; Bernheimer v. Converse, (1907) 206 U.S. 516, 51 L. Ed.
1163, 27 S.C.R. 755; Converse v. Hamilton, (1912) 224 U.S. 243, 255, 56
L. Ed. 749, 32 S.C.R. 415.
"I2 Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co. v. Langdon, (1890) 44 Minn. 37, 46
N.Mr. 310; Merchants Natl. Bank v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co., (1891)
48 Minn. 361, 51 N.W. 119; McKusick v. Seymour, Sabin & Co., (1892)
48 Minn. 158, 50 N.W. 1114. See Pittsburgh Steel Co. v. Baltimore Eq.
Soc., (1913) 226 U.S. 455, 57 L. Ed. 297, 33 S.C.R. 167.
"13 Hornor v. Henning, (1876), 93 U.S. 228, 23 L. Ed. 879; Signor Tie Co.
v. Monett, etc. Co., (1912) 198 Fed. 412.
"I4 Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co., (1891) 48 Minn. 174, 50
N.W. 111-7, Minn. G.S. 1913, sec. 6634. Hastings Malting Co. v. Iron
Range Brewing Co., (1896) 65 Minn. 28, 67 N.W. 652; Merchants Nat.
Bank v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co. (1891) 48 Minn. 361, 364, 51 N.W.
119.
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for the enforcement of the constitutional liability.11 The liability
of the stockholders to pay the par value of the stock held by them
may be enforced in the sequestration suit upon the petition or
complaint of the receiver or of creditors who have become parties
to it. The complaint is, as we have seen, not the commencement of
an independent action by creditors in their own behalf, but is
filed in the sequestration proceeding itself and in aid of it.
Under sec. 6645 Minn. G. S. 1913, the receiver or assignee of
a corporation, as well as any creditor, may petition that the court
order an assessment to enforce any kind of liability of stock-
holders to creditors. This provision for the enforcement of the
liability of stockholders by a ratable assessment does not supersede
the equitable remedy for the enforcement of the liability of holders
of bonus or watered stock for the difference between its par
value and the amount paid for it. Creditors may enforce such
liability by a suit in equity in the federal courts.116 A statutory
remedy for the enforcement of liabilities not created by statute
is not exclusive.
In the case of Randall Printing Co. v. Sanitas Mineral Water
Co., "'- it is said that an action in the nature of a creditor's bill
to reach unpaid subscriptions for the benefit of all the creditors
may be maintained under R. L. 1905 sec. 3173, Minn., G. S. 1913
sec. 6634 to enforce the liability of resident stockholders in a
foreign corporation upon underpaid or bonus stock issued for
services to be rendered as directors." 8 It is somewhat difficult to
see how. a "creditors' bill' strictly so called will lie to enforce the
liability arising out of the legal fraud which results from the issue
of bonus or watered stock. If the present theory is sound that
such liability is not an asset of the corporation but is a direct tort
liability to the creditor, it would seem rather to be in the nature of
a tort action. A judgment creditor's bill, is in its essence an equit-
able action comparable to proceedings supplementary to execu-
tion."19 The stockholder's duty to pay par for his stock is indeed
essentially capital of the corporation and that is why it is to be
equitably enforced for the benefit of all creditors and not by a
race of diligence between creditors. 2
"s5 Northwestern Railroader v. Prior, (1897) 68 Minn. 95, 70 N. W. 869,
Fish v. Chase, (1911) 114 Minn. 460, 131 N.W. 631.
"16Second National Bank of Erie v. Georger, (1916) 246 Fed. 517.
'I7(1913) 120 Minn. 268, 139 N.W. 606.
118See also McConey v. Belton, (1906) 97 Minn. 190, 106 N.W. 900;
assessment.not proper as preliminary. Dispatch Printing Company v. Se-
curity Bond, etc., Co., (Minn. Jan. 12, 1923.)
119 Pierce v. United States, (1921) 255 U.S. 398, 402, 65 L. Ed. 404.
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Indebtedness of stockholders upon subscriptions to stock is a
debt to the corporation itself, not to the creditors. Upon appoint-
ment of a receiver of an insolvent corporation, the right to recover
unpaid subscriptions, or capital withdrawn and refunded to stock-
holders passes to the receiver as part of the assets of the corpora-
tion.12' The liability upon bonus and underpaid stock, however,
according to the fraud theory, is not and never was an asset of the
corporation, for it is due directly to the creditors, and the receiver
could not enforce it in the absence of statute. 22 Yet it is held
that when a corporation is insolvent and in the hands of a receiver,
the right to enforce liability for bonus stock, like the liability to
return funds withdrawn from capital on subscriptions unpaid,
cannot be asserted by an individual creditor in proceedings inde-
pendent of the receivership. The duty to pay the par value is
regarded as a potential part of the capital.123  As in the case of
double liability stockholders can only be compelled to contribute
to the deficiency ascertained after the corporate assets are distri-
buted among the creditors, which has to be done in the sequestra-
tion proceeding, if one is pending.'
24
Under the Minnesota doctrine that the stockholders liability
for bonus stock is based upon fraudulent representations and that
only subsequent creditors who rely upon the representation can
recover, the trustee in bankruptcy of the corporation, as successor
to the property of the bankrupt, is not the proper person to sue
the stockholders. The liability is not an asset of the corporation
and does not pass to the trustee, and the bankruptcy act does not
give the trustee the right to sue as a representative of the credi-
tors.12
5
As pointed out by Justice Dibell in the Kenney Case 26 the re-
sult is unfortunate as the bankruptcy court ought to be able to wind
up the whole matter. As Justice Dibell says:
120See Pittsburgh Steel Co. v. Baltimore Equitable Society, (1913) 226
U.S. 455, 57 L. Ed. 297, 33 S.C.R. 167.
12'Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co. v. Langdon, (1890) 44 Minn. 37, 46N.W. 310.12NSee Tardy's Smith on Receivers, 2nd. ed., sec. 357.
12 Merchants 'Nat. Bank v. Northwestern Mfg, & Car. Co., (1891) 48
Minn. 361, 51 N.W. 119.124McKusick v. Seymour & Co., (1891) 48 Minn. 158, 50 N.W. 1114.
225State Bank of Commerce v. Kenney Band Instrument Co., (1919)
143 Minn. 236, 173 N.W. 560; Selig v. Hamilton, (1914) 234 N.S. 652,
58 L. Ed. 1518, 34 S.C.R. 926, Ann. Cas. 1917A 104; Courtney v. Croxton,
(1917) 152 C.C.A. 235, 239 Fed. 247; Courtney v. Georger, (1916) 143 C.C.A.
257, 228 Fed. 859.
12(1919) 143 Minn. 236, 173 N.W. 560.
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"A holding which would permit the bankruptcy court in its
administration of the bankrupt estate to enforce through its trustee
the liability of holders of bonus stock, or to decline to do so and
leave it to the state courts, as the convenience of the particular
estate suggests, or which would permit the state court to proceed
upon the refusal or failure of the trustee or the bankruptcy court
to take action, would be workable. This would leave the right
of administration in the bankruptcy court with the right in the
creditors to prosecute the stock liability if the trustee would not.
It might be well if the trustee had the requisite authority and the
question were made one of convenient practice.' 127
By Minn. G. S. 1913 sec. 6178 it is declared that each 'stock-
holder shall be personally liable for corporate debts in the fol-
lowing cases:
"1. For all unpaid installments on stock owned by him or
transferred for the purpose of defrauding creditors." It is held
in MIerchant's Nat. Bank v. Bailey Mfg. Co., 128 that an action may
be maintained under this section by a single creditor against a
solvent corporation and one or more of it! stockholders, some-
what in the nature of a garnishment to enforce payment of unpaid
installments due on stock for his own benefit. Probably an action
would not lie under this section to enforce liability on watered or
bonus stock. The double or constitutional liability of stockholders
cannot be enfirced under this statute.129
CONCLUSION
A study of our corporation laws simply with reference to
stockholders' liability to creditors and the remedies for its enforce-
ment is sufficient to show that these laws are in a condition calling
for prompt and systematic revision. They neither afford ade-
quate protection to creditors nor suitable facilities to capitalists
and organizers wishing to promote business enterprises.
It is possible, under our present law, to have a corporation
without stockholders or capital stock, which is a legal monstrosity.
It is possible to have a corporation with only two or three shares
issued, the capital of which is raised by bonds, so that the real
'
27See Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Nichols, (1917) 199 Mich. 126, 165
N.W. 667; Stacker v. Davidson, (1906) 74 Kan. 214, 86 Pac. 136; In re
Crystal Springs Bottling Co., (1899) 96 Fed. 945; Bergin v. Blackwood,
(1919) 141 Minn. 325, 170 N.W. 508.
12S(1885) 34 Minn. 323.
129Winnebago Paper Mills v. Northwestern Printing Co., (1895) 61
Minn. 543, 553, 63 N.W. 1024.
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proprietors do business under the shield of a mortgage lien, with
virtual immunity from the claims of creditors, a gross perversion
of corporate mechanism.
The method adopted of enforcing contributions of capital to
the corporate being which the law permits the incorporators to
spawn upon the business world is ineffectual and leads to system-
atic evasion. Its enforcement is based upon an artificial theory of
fictitious fraud, which operates in favor of one class of creditors
who have no better claim to insist on these contributions to the
enterprise than another class of creditors. This does not mean
that we ought to give up all attempt to enforce proper contribu-
tions of capital or to regulate inflation of stock.
Our constitutional double liability is contrary to the public
interest and out of date except as to banks and financial corpora-
tions. It results in substantial public inconvenience and loss; it
is a sword hanging over the head of unsuspecting investors; it
discriminates unfairly against Minnesota corporations in favor
of foreign corporations, and deprives the state of a large and
legitimate source of income from corporation fees and taxes
because new enterprises are forced to seek incorporation in other
states. Non-par stock laws, such as are being enacted in many
other states cannot safely be enacted in Minnesota without a con-
stitutional amendment.130 In short it is evident that we have here a
subject of great practical importance to the business and pros-
perity of the state, which demands comprehensive study by scien-
tific legislative draftsmen. Acts should be devised promptly to
require the subscription and payment of a minimum capital
stock as a condition precedent to the right to begin business; and
to limit the issue of mortgage bonds to some proportion of the
amount of stock issued, so that incorporators may not be allowed
to place the owners of the business in the position of preferred
creditors for the capital contributed. Those who are given the
hope of unlimited profits should surely take a reasonable degree
of risk as the price of limited liability.
130 Four amendments to article 10, sec. 3, have been submitted to the
voters without success. Minn. Laws, 1870 ch. 21; Minn. Laws, 1875 ch.
4; Minn. Laws, 1876 ch. 2; Minn. Laws, 1877 ch. 4; Anderson, History of
the.consfitution of Minnesota 196, 197, 249.
